Speech as Violence?

Given that this is a blog, this topic seemed like a logical starting point.  I stated in my last post that the proper use of force by the government must be restricted to the protection of, primarily negative, individual rights when threatened or violated by force/violence or fraud.  This in turn begs the question of what (if anything) constitutes violence beyond the obvious case of physical aggression.  Some have taken the position that speech alone inflicts damage and therefore constitutes violence that should be met with violence in turn.  There are a number of problems with this position that I will outline below.

First, in order for something to constitute a right, its exercise cannot violate the rights of others.  This creates a fundamental conflict between rights claims that cannot be avoided.  Granting that the traditional restrictions (fire in a crowded theater, slander, etc.) are generally appropriate, the question becomes what those restrictions have in common.  The answer is that those categories of speech consist of specific, factually (as opposed to normatively) incorrect claims that will predictably result in injuries.  That is, obvious physical damage from the stampede in the theater and the inability to enter into relationships with individuals who believe the slanderous claims.  Note, however, that in the case of slander, simply making a false claim is not sufficient to trigger liability (and the bar is much higher when dealing with public figures).  As with the next objection below, the result of making all false claims actionable would be to suppress speech across the board due to the desire to avoid liability in an environment in which perfect information is never available.  All of this is to say that declaring all upsetting speech to be violence would suppress speech in the absence of a rights violation.  To that extent, the use of actual violence to silence it is not justified.

Second, if all beliefs expressed in speech are deemed violence so long as someone is sufficiently upset, virtually no speech would be permitted in short order.  Such a standard would obviously be unworkable in practice, so it would only beg the question of which statements/groups are to be protected.  For example, if someone objects to same sex marriage on the grounds that it is unnatural according to his or her religious beliefs, a supporter could assert that this claim is bigoted and that the objector should be punished for expressing this view.  The objector in turn, however, could assert that the claim of bigotry itself is a form of violence to the extent that it attacks the objector for his or her religious beliefs.  The only way out of an impasse like this would be to declare that some forms of identity are more equal than others.  If the objective of the supporters of the claim that speech is equivalent to violence is the protection of vulnerable minorities, they should think long and hard about whether such a standard is counterproductive.

Lastly, the suppression of speech only encourages violence in turn from the speakers who have been silenced.  If even the possibility of convincing others by their speech that they are right has been taken away, that only leaves two alternatives:  surrender or violence.  If the issue in question is important and fundamental enough, violence will appear to be the only honorable choice.  Making matters worse, declaring their speech unlawful will only drive them underground rather than changing their minds.  This will have two negative consequences.  First, it will create an echo chamber because they will never have an opportunity to openly engage with those who disagree with them.  Not only will their beliefs go unchallenged, but the more radical elements will be likely to take the rest of the group to an even greater extreme.  Second, it will make it much more difficult to identify real threats before they have passed the point of no return.

Once again, this has taken much longer to write than I anticipated, so I will end my post here (as incomplete as it may be).  I could stare at my monitor for another hour or two, but I suspect that I have reached the point of diminishing returns for now.

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